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NOTES
ZOBREST V. CATALINA FOOTHILLS SCHOOL DISTRICT, 113 S. CT.
2462 (1993): AN ANSWERED PRAYER TO STUDENTS WITH
DISABILITIES IN RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS
I. INTRODUCTION
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, the United
States Supreme Court held that the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution' did not prevent
a public school district from providing a hearing-impaired student
with a certified sign-language interpreter 2 to facilitate his education
in a sectarian school.3 In doing so, the Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals' decision that the provision of such aid
in the context of a parochial school is a violation of the Establishment
Clause because its primary effect would be to advance religion. 4 As
a further refinement of the "parochiaid doctrine," 5 the Court's
decision removes a constitutional barrier to certain modes of deliv-
ering special education and related services in religious schools. The
Court's analysis also marks a significant departure from decades of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence based on a three-part purpose-
effect-entanglement analysis .6
1. The Establishment Clause is the first of the two Religion Clauses in the
First Amendment; it provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. It is followed by a second,
Free Exercise Clause forbidding Congress from "prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.. . ." Id. The conflict between the two is obvious. On the one hand,
Congress may not establish religion; on the other, it may not impede its practice.
2. A certified sign-language interpreter has been certified by the Registry of
Interpreters for the Deaf and is bound by the Registry's Code of Ethics. The Code
defines "interpret" as translating spoken English to American Sign Language or
American Sign Language to spoken English. Interpreters must transmit everything
in the manner intended by the speaker and are responsible for conveying accurately.
If the interpreter is influenced by his own feelings, the Code requires that he
withdraw from the situation. Petitioner's Brief, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.
Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993) (citing Joint Appendix, petition for cert. at 73-74)
available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
3. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2463 (1993).
4. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir.
1992), rev'd, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2463 (1993).
5. Commentators frequently use the term "parochiaid" to refer to state aid
to parochial schools. See, e.g., Thomas F. Guernsey & M. Grey Sweeney, The
Church, the State, and the EHA: Educating the Handicapped in Light of the
Establishment Clause, 73 MARQ. L. REV., 259, 267 n.65 (1989).
6. See discussion infra part III.A.
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II. FACTS
In 1987, James Zobrest, a 14-year-old junior high school student,
deaf since birth, enrolled in Salpointe Catholic High School in
Tucson, Arizona, for the school year commencing August, 1988. 7
Larry and Sandra Zobrest, his parents, asked Catalina Foothills
School District, their local district, to supply James with a sign-
language interpreter to accompany him to classes at Salpointe as
provided by the Education of the Handicapped Act and its Arizona
counterpart, Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated Section 1400.8
Prior to that time, James had attended both public and non-
religious private schools, including a school for the deaf during
grades one through five and a public junior high school in grades
six through eight. 9 At the junior high level, the school district had
furnished James with a mainstream program 0 on public school
premises that included a speech therapist and an interpreter for all
his classes."
When James was ready to enter high school, the Zobrests, who
are Roman Catholic, believed it was essential that their adolescent
son transfer to a religious school where daily worship is held and
religious values are encouraged. 2 Salpointe's curriculum included a
required religion class, and students were strongly encouraged to
attend daily mass. 3 Moreover, the faculty's mission was to illustrate
how "[tihe presence of God is manifest in nature, human history,
in the struggles for economic and political justice, and other secular
areas of the curriculum.' ' 4
In response to the Zobrests' request, the school district replied
that it would supply an interpreter for James in any Arizona public
high school."5 However, it referred the question of whether the school
district would provide an interpreter at Salpointe to the Pima County,
7. Petitioner's Brief.
8. Id.
9. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464.
10. Mainstreaming seeks to place children with disabilities into the mainstream
of education, which is the regular classroom. The concept is harmonious with the
"least restrictive environment" approach to special education which strives to educate
children with disabilities and nondisabled children together to the maximum extent
appropriate. LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITIES AND THE LAW 102 (1992).
11. Petitioner's Brief, n.1.
12. Petitioner's Brief.
13. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2472 (citing Appendix at 90).
14. Id. (quoting Appendix at 92).
15. Respondents' Brief, Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. 2462, available in LEXIS, Genfed
Library, Briefs [hereinafter Respondents' Brief].
[Vol. 16:449
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Arizona, Attorney's Office.' 6 That office issued an opinion that to
grant the Zobrests' request would violate both the United States
Constitution and the Arizona State Constitution. 7 The Arizona At-
torney General concurred.'
The Zobrests then filed suit against the school district in federal
district court. 9 The district court granted summary judgment for
the school district and dismissed the suit on constitutional grounds. 20
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision. 21
The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. 22
It held that state aid neutrally providing benefits to a broad class
defined without reference to religion is not readily subject to an
Establishment Clause challenge just because a religious institution
receives an incidental benefit. 23 The Court also ruled that the pru-
dential rule of avoiding constitutional questions if there is a non-
constitutional basis for decision was inapplicable in this case.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464 (citing Appendix to Petition for cert. A-137).
The Arizona Constitution mandates that "[n]o public money or property shall be
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or to
the support of any religious establishment." ARiz. CoNsT. art. II, § 12.
19. Zobrest, 963 F.2d 1190.
20. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464. The district court found that the "interpreter
would act as a conduit for the religious inculcation of James-thereby, promoting
James' religious development at government expense." Id. (quoting Appendix to
Petition for cert. A-35).
21. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1197. The Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided
vote, ruling that if the school district supplied funds for an interpreter at a religious
school, the "primary effect" would be to advance religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 1196.
The dissenting judge took the position that because this type of aid was neutrally
available to all students, it did not violate the clause. Id. at 1206 (Tang, J.,
dissenting).
22. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2469. During the pendency of the litigation, James
completed his high school studies and graduated from Salpointe in 1992; however,
the Court ruled the case presented a continuing controversy because in appealing
the Circuit Court of Appeals decision, the Zobrests sought reimbursement of the
$7000 they spent furnishing an interpreter for James throughout high school. Id.
at 2464 n.3.
23. Id. at 2469. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion, joined
by Justices White, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justices O'Connor and Stevens
joined the majority as to the Establishment Clause issue but dissented on other
grounds. Id. at 2463-64.
24. Id. at 2466. The Court refused to invoke the prudential rule because the
school district failed to raise nonconstitutional grounds in the school district's
arguments to the district court and court of appeals.
Justices Blackmun, Souter, O'Connor and Stevens dissented from this holding.
Writing for the dissent, Justice Blackmun noted that the Court could refrain from
19941
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III. HISTORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AS APPLIED TO
GOVERNMENT AID TO RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS
The deceptively simple wording of the Establishment Clause
assumes an element of complexity when applied in the contemporary
context of state aid to religious schools. Stated succinctly, disputes
over government funding to parochial schools25 typically focus on
whether the Establishment Clause forbids such aid as an unconsti-
tutional advancement of the particular religious sect which supports
the school.
The policy underlying the Establishment Clause is a belief in
the necessity of separation of church and state, an idea with historical
links to Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and the colonists who
fled England because of religious persecution. 26 With regard to state
aid to religious schools, Jefferson's familiar "wall of separation"
metaphor has come to symbolize the dividing line between the per-
missible and the proscribed.2 7
deciding the constitutional claim and remand the case for consideration on statutory
and regulatory grounds. He emphasized that "regardless of the Court's views on
the Establishment Clause, petitioners will not obtain what they seek if the federal
statute does not require or if the federal regulations prohibit providing a sign-
language interpreter in a sectarian school." Id. at 2470 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
25. For an examination of other contexts in which the Establishment Clause
has been applied, see County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578 (1989)
(stating that a creche in the county courthouse violated the Establishment Clause
but a menorah and a Christmas tree in the city-county office building a block
away did not); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), reh'g denied, 466 U.S.
994 (1984) (holding that a city park's nativity scene used with nonreligious symbols
of the holidays was not done for any purpose which threatened Establishment
Clause values); and Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (holding that
opening benedictions for legislative sessions did not violate the Establishment Clause).
26. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1946). Everson refers
to the ideas of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, both of whom were in-
strumental in the drafting of the First Amendment. The Court appended the
Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments in which Madison ex-
plained why he opposed the Virginia tax levy supporting the established church.
Among his arguments was the theory that religion is a matter of reason, conviction,
and personal liberty and thus should not be subjected to the authority of a legislative
body. Id. at 64-65.
27. But see Mark Fischer, The Sacred and the Secular: An Examination of the
"Wall of Separation" and Its Impact on the Religious World View, 54 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 325, 331-32 (1992) (noting that while Jefferson feared that a state church
would endanger individual liberty, the view expressed by Roger Williams was that
without a separation, the world would corrupt the church. Interestingly, Jefferson's
wall of separation metaphor was borrowed from Williams. The author suggests
that Williams's metaphor more accurately reflects the prevalant sentiments of the
colonial period.)
See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). In Engel, the Court used
both points of view to formulate its policy that cohesion of government and religion
tends to be detrimental to both.
452 [Vol. 16:449
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Beginning with the earliest cases examining this issue, the Court
has continually defined and redefined the scope of the Establishment
Clause. In Everson v. Board of Education,2 the Court developed
the child benefit theory as a classification within the neutrality
principle. The Court explained that the First Amendment requires
simply that the state remain neutral, not hostile, in its relations with
religious and nonreligious groups alike. 29
A. The Genesis of the Lemon Test
From the neutrality principle and other unambiguous premises,
the Court has progressed to a complicated system of Establishment
Clause principles. The confusion results from two factors. The first
is a change in the character of the Court from separationist to
accommodationist10 The second factor is the Lemon test, a three-
pronged approach to answer the question of whether government
aid to religious schools is permissible under the Establishment Clause.3'
Despite its widespread influence, the Lemon test, which one critic
has observed is aptly named,3 2 has had its share of detractors,3 3 in
28. 330 U.S. at 17. The Court held free bus transportation to all school children
did not aid religion even though it was provided to students attending religious
schools. The Court compared the provision of bus fare to services like state-paid
policemen assigned to protect children going to and from church schools. Legislation
promoting such programs which are of general benefit to children, regardless of
religion, are permissible under the Establishment Clause. Id. at 18.
29. Id. at 18. In one of the earliest cases deciding the issue of state aid to
religious schools, Justice Black, writing for the majority, stated: "The 'establishment
of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor
the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." Id. at 15.
See also Guernesy, supra note 5, at 269. The author asserts that if the neutrality
approach of the Court in Everson had survived, fewer questions would arise about
the validity of state aid to handicapped children in parochial schools. Id.
30. Joseph R. McKinney, Commentary, Special Education and the Establishment
Clause, 65 EDUC. L. REP., 19-20 (1991). The author suggests that former President
Ronald Reagan's political agenda included removing obstacles to government aid
to religious schools, a goal facilitated by adding three new justices to the United
States Supreme Court during the 1980s. Those three plus a conservative Bush
appointee in 1990 augmented the existing accommodationist camp of Justices Rehn-
quist and White, both of whom have embraced a less rigid interpretation of
separation of church and state. On the other hand, the separationists adhere to a
strict separation of church and state, a viewpoint with dwindling Supreme Court
support.
31. See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
32. Mark E. Chopko, Religious Access to Public Programs and Governmental
Funding, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 645, 654 (1992).
33. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113
S. Ct. 2141, 2149-50 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting), in which Justice Scalia launched
19941
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part because of the confusing system of rules it has left in its wake.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court formulated the purpose-
effect-entanglement test 34 in holding that two state laws granting
salary supplements to teachers in religious schools were
unconstitutional. 35 The Court's basis for this test was a composite
of two previous rulings on Establishment Clause issues:36 Board of
Education v. Allen37 and Walz v. Tax Commission.8
The Court's formula in Lemon borrowed the purpose and effect
prongs from Allen39 and the involvement prong from Walz.4° In
testing a law to see if it passes Establishment Clause scrutiny, the
Lemon rule dictates that the law must have a secular legislative
purpose, its primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion,
and it must avoid excessive government entanglement with religion. 41
On the basis of this test, the Lemon Court found that both state
laws violated the excessive entanglement prong. 42
B. The Purpose Prong
Between 1971 and 1993, the Court applied the Lemon test to
every Establishment Clause case except two.4 3 During that period,
his most recent attack on Lemon, comparing it to "some ghoul in a late-night
horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being
repeatedly killed and buried .... [N]o fewer than five of the currently sitting
Justices have, in their own opinions, personally driven pencils through the creature's
heart. .... "
34. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
35. Id. at 607.
36. Id. at 612-13.
37. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
38. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
39. Allen, 392 U.S. at 242-43 (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S; 203, 222 (1963) (citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1946)
and McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961))). The Court in Allen upheld
the provision of loaning secular textbooks free of charge to parochial students
under a purpose and effects test which helped to draw the line between neutrality
and state support of religion. Id. at 243-44.
40. Walz, 397 U.S. at 668. The Watlz Court first articulated the entanglements
prong of the Lemon test in ruling that a state law exempting religious organizations
from property and income tax was not unconstitutional. Id. at 667. The Court
noted the three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended
to protect: "[slponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign
in religious activity." Id. at 668.
41. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
42. Id. at 613. The invalidated laws included protections of the separation
between secular and religious educational functions to ensure that state financial
aid supported only the secular, but the laws failed the test because the required
surveillance actually created a church-state relationship involving excessive govern-
ment entanglement. Id. at 613-14, 619-21.
43. Isabel M. Humphrey, Note, Establishment Clause Prohibits Provision of
[Vol. 16:449
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the Court rarely invalidated a law under the purpose prong if the
issue was state aid to religious schools. 4 In the context of the Lemon
test, the Court examines the primary purpose of legislation as
determined by the statute on its face, its legislative history, or its
interpretation by a responsible administrative agency. 41 If legislation
either uses or attempts to use the symbolic and financial support
of government to achieve a religious purpose, the statute violates
the clause.46
C. The Primary Effect Prong
In contrast to the purpose prong, the Court has frequently
applied the effect prong of the Lemon test to find that a law violates
the Establishment Clause when the context is state aid to religious
schools. 47 Because of the very nature of the relationship, any state
funding to religious schools, no matter how broad or unbiased its
purpose, has an inherent potential for advancing religion instead of,
or in addition to, providing aid to the students.
D. Casualties of the Effect Prong
In 1977, opponents challenged several different forms of state
aid to religious schools in Wolman v. Walter.4 1 In that decision,
State-Paid Sign Language Interpreter to Student Attending Pervasively Religious
High School: Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 963 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992), 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 449, 459 (1993). The
Court did not apply the test in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (using
a traditional analysis to rule that opening benedictions for legislative sessions did
not violate the Establishment Clause), or in Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649
(1992) (applying instead a controlling precedents test in holding that a benediction
at a middle school graduation was unconstitutional because the state was, in effect,
enforcing a religious orthodoxy).
44. See, e.g., U.S. Supreme Court decisions invalidating laws for lack of a
secular purpose: Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987) (stating that the
primary purpose of Louisiana's Creationism Act was to advance a particular religious
belief in violation of the Establishment Clause); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38
(1985) (holding the purpose prong of the Lemon test most clearly implicated in a
state law authorizing a one-minute period of silence in all public schools for
meditation or prayer); and Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding that
Kentucky's law requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public school
rooms has no secular legislative purpose).
45. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594 (1987).
46. Id. at 597.
47. See Humphrey, supra note 43, at 454. The article discusses the narrow and
broad interpretations of the primary effect prong, noting that the majority of the
Court's cases in this area has examined state programs as a whole rather than
concentrating on the particular facts of a case.
48. 433 U.S, 229 (1977).
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the Court permitted a number of forms of state aid, including
diagnostic services on the premises of nonpublic schools; the Court
ruled that, unlike teaching or counseling, these services are not closely
associated with the educational mission of the nonpublic school and
the opportunity to express sectarian views is absent.4 9 Moreover, no
impermissible effect or entanglement existed in therapeutic services
offered off the premises of the religious schools because the neutral
location assured the absence of pressure from a religious environment. 0
However, on the basis of Meek v. Pittenger," the Court held
that the Lemon primary effect prong did forbid the loan of
instructional materials and equipment 2 and transportation for field
trips. 3 The rationale for the proscription of both forms of aid was
that they contributed to the sectarian enterprise, an impermissible
effect .14
Another casualty of Lemon's effect prong occurred in 1985
when the Court ruled that two Grand Rapids School District programs
violated the Establishment Clause.55 The Court in Grand Rapids
decided that the programs had the impermissible effect of aiding
religion in three ways: (1) state-paid teachers in sectarian environments
may inadvertently inculcate religious teachings; (2) the programs
create the appearance of a symbolic union of church and state
because of the close relationship; and (3) the core-curriculum
supplement program relieved the nonpublic school of its primary
responsibility. Thus, they functioned as direct subsidies or aids to
the enterprise rather than as an incidental benefit to the school.16
49. Id. at 244.
50. Id. at 247.
51. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
52. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 251. The Ohio program allowed loans of instructional
material and equipment directly to parents or children in the nonpublic schools
rather than to the schools themselves, but the Court decided that channeling the
aid directly through the students rather than the schools did not absolve the program
of its unconstitutionality. Id. at 250.
53. Id. at 255.
54. Id. at 250, 253. In the case of field trips, the Court observed that not only
is there an aid to the enterprise, but also the danger exists that field trips led by
teachers may be opportunities for fostering religion, another impermissible effect.
Id. at 254.
55. School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985). The Shared
Time and Community Education programs provided classes to nonpublic school
students through public funding. Id. at 375. Shared time supplemented Michigan's
core curriculum with remedial and enrichment courses, while Community Education
offered children and adults classes at the close of the regular school day at religious
schools as well as other sites in the community. Id. at 375-76.
56. Id. at 397. But see Chopko, supra note 32, at 658-59 (discussing the Court's
[Vol. 16:449
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E. Cases Surviving Establishment Clause Scrutiny
Despite the effect prong's lethal blow to many programs granting
government aid to religious schools, occasionally such laws have
survived constitutional scrutiny. Significant among those have been
a Minnesota law challenged in Mueller v. Allen57 and a Washington
law examined by the Court in Witters v. Washington Department
of Services for the Blind."
In Mueller, the Court refused to invalidate a Minnesota law
allowing taxpayers to deduct the costs of tuition, textbooks and
transportation for their children attending elementary and secondary
schools.5 9 Applying the Lemon test, the Court decided the law's
effect did not advance sectarian aims because the tax deductions
were available to all parents, not just parents of nonpublic school
children. 6w The opinion advances the theory that if any aid to the
parents flows to the school, it does so as a result of private, as
opposed to government, choices. 61 Therefore, a stamp of state approval
does not exist. 62
The Court in Witters unanimously agreed that the First
Amendment did not preclude a state vocational rehabilitation program
from assisting a blind student enrolled at a private Christian college
in order to become either a pastor, missionary, or youth director. 63
In finding that no impermissible effect of advancing religion existed,
the Court echoed some of the same reasoning applied in Mueller.
First, because the assistance was paid directly to the student, the
"metaphorical distinction" that the primary effect prong proscribes a symbolic
union between religion and government. The author states that the Court's distinction
is perverse since it is not the symbolic union but the actual union of church and
state that violates the Constitution.)
57. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
58. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
59. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 391.
60. Id. at 397.
61. Id. at 399.
62. Id. at 399 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981)). In
Widmar, the Court held that a university's policy allowing access to meeting facilities
to both religious and nonreligious groups did not violate the Establishment Clause
because access was available to a broad spectrum of nonreligious and religious
groups. 454 U.S. 263, 275.
See also Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226 (1990). The Court held that a high school student requesting school officials'
permission to form a Christian Club was entitled to do so because a broad spectrum
of groups may organize, counteracting any message of endorsement of one club.
Id. at 252.




fact that it supported an education at a religious school was a matter
of private choice, and the aid itself offered no incentive for the
student to choose a religious school. 64 Second, nothing in the program
indicated that this was a direct subsidy to the college itself because
no significant portion of the aid flowed to religious education. 65
Third, the program was neutral in offering educational assistance
to a class defined without reference to religion.66
F. The Excessive Entanglement Prong
In the Lemon test framework, if a law providing state aid to
sectarian schools safely escapes the Scylla of the primary effect
prong, it must also withstand the Charybdis of the excessive
entanglement test. 67 The excessive entanglement prong has been
characterized as the "Catch 22" of the Lemon test: to prevent an
impermissible effect of providing funds to inculcate religion,
monitoring of the programs becomes necessary; this monitoring, in
turn, causes excessive entanglement between church and state. 68
Two cases illustrate how the Court has applied this prong in
proscribing governmental aid to religious schools. The decision in
Meek v. Pittengere9 examined Pennsylvania's aid to nonpublic
elementary and secondary schools in the form of textbook loans,
loans of instructional materials, and auxiliary services.70
64. Id. at 488; See also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609 (1988) (illustrating
how a religious institution may participate in a publicly sponsored social welfare
program without violating the Establishment Clause. In Bowen, the Court found
no facial violation by an act granting federal funds to religious organizations and
other groups to provide counseling related to family life and premarital adolescent
sexual relations).
65. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
66. Id. at 490-91.
67. Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973).
68. Fisher, supra note 27, at 336. The author's tongue in cheek explanation of
the Court's use of the excessive entanglements prong begins with the Court's premise
that since public school employees in religious schools have a tendency to lapse
into indoctrination outlawed by the First Amendment, they must be closely mon-
itored. The problem, the author comments, is that, "lo and behold, such monitoring
is forbidden by the excessive entanglement test. Thus, the religious schools are
caught in the loop." Id.
69. 421 U.S. 349 (1974).
70. Id. at 351-53. The auxiliary aid included counseling, testing, psychological
services, speech and hearing therapy, and related support for exceptional, remedial,
and educationally disadvantaged students.
The Court permitted the textbook loan to students on the basis of Allen, 421
U.S. at 361, but in applying the effect prong of the Lemon test, the Court ruled
that supplying instructional materials directly to the schools violated the Estab-
lishment Clause as an impermissible aid to the enterprise. Id. at 366.
[Vol. 16:449
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In examining the auxiliary services, the Court recognized that
without continuing state surveillance, there was a likelihood of an
inadvertent fostering of religion.7 But the Court reasoned that
monitoring would create excessive administrative entanglement and,
in a broader sense, excessive political entanglement. The Court
envisioned a state of affairs where annual reconsideration of the
appropriation would provide yearly opportunities for political and
religious division.
72
The excessive entanglement prong of Lemon was also the
instrument the Court employed in Aguilar v. Felton71 to invalidate
New York City's use of federal funds to pay public school employees
to teach low-income children in parochial schools. 74 In that case,
the Court ruled that the program required a pervasive state presence
to ensure against the primary effect of advancing religion.75 The
pervasive state presence, in turn, would lead to excessive
entanglement .76
IV. STATUTORY SOURCES OF GOVERNMENT AID TO STUDENTS
WITH DISABILITIES IN RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS
Congress has enacted legislation granting access to special
education 77 programs and related services 78 to students with disa-
71. Id. at 371.
72. Id. at 372.
73. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
74. Id. at 414.
75. Id. at 409.
76. Id. See Allan G. Osborne, Commentary, Special Education and Related
Services for Parochial School Students, 81 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 1-2 (1993) (observing
that at the time of the Aguilar decision, most education law commentators assumed
the case would also control state funding of programs for students with disabilities
in religious schools because the situation was similar to administration of Title I
funds for low income students in parochial schools. As a result, most public school
districts have provided special education to disabled parochial students at off-
campus locations to avoid implicating the excessive entanglement prong.)
See also Guernsey, supra note 5, at 276-77, for a similar discussion of the
Aguilar holding as a basis for determining whether state aid to parochial school
children with disabilities could be administered at the religious school.
77. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (Supp. III 1991) defines "special education" as specially
designed instruction, at no cost to parent or guardian, to meet the unique needs
of a child with a handicap. Special education may include physical education and
instruction in classrooms, homes, hospitals, and other institutions and settings.
78. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (Supp. III 1991) provides that related services include:
"[T]ransportation and other developmental, corrective and supportive services ...
including speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and
occupational therapy, ... to assist the child with a disability to benefit from
special education. . .
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bilities. In the context of state aid to religious schools, this body
of law contains three federal statutes applicable to parochial aid
issues: The Rehabilitation Act, 79 the Americans with Disabilities Act, 0
and the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA).8"
The Rehabilitation Act, which took effect in 1973, was the first
major comprehensive federal law involving persons with handicaps.8 2
Section 504 forbids exclusion of persons from any federally funded
program if the sole basis of the exclusion is that person's handicap.8 3
By contrast, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits
various types of public and private entities from discriminating
against persons with disabilities, whether or not the entity receives
federal funds.84 The statute relates both to services provided by
agencies such as public schools 5 and to public accommodations
privately operated, such as those offered by private schools.8 6 Al-
though there is some overlap among the provisions of ADA, the
Rehabilitation Act, and the IDEA, each statute also addresses certain
situations not covered by the other.8 7 For example, ADA requires
the removal of architectural barriers in private schools but neither
the Rehabilitation Act nor the IDEA so provide. 8
A. Background and Purposes of the IDEA
Four related purposes constitute the IDEA 9 framework. First,
the law seeks to ensure that all "children with disabilities have
available to them ... a free appropriate public education 9° which
79. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. IV 1992).
81. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1484 (Supp. IV 1992).
82. LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, DIsABILrrIEs AND THE LAW 84 (1992).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. IV 1992).
85. Id. §§ 12131-12165.
86. Id. §§ 12181-12189.
87. LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, DiSABILITIES AND THE LAW 90 (1992).
88. Id. at 90-91.
89. The IDEA is the progeny of the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975, which in turn was an amendment to the Education of the Handicapped
Act of 1970. Rothstein, supra note 82, at 91. The EHA provided the funding for
special education while EAHCA added the procedural safeguards for the programs,
adopting constitutionally mandated procedures of evaluation, placement, hearing
rights, records, and notice in cases involving education and children with disabilities.
Rothstein, supra note 82, at 86-88.
90. This requirement is often abbreviated as "FAPE." It is defined as "special
education and related services ... provided at public expense, under public su-
pervision . . .without charge, . . . [to] meet the standards of the State educational
agency, include an appropriate ... education in the State involved, and ...
[conform] with the [individual] education program." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18) (1988).
[Vol. 16:449
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet
their unique needs." 9' Meeting these needs necessitates the development
of an individualized education program. This program is a statement
prepared by a representative of the educational agency responsible
for instructing the child. It sets out the level of educational
performance of the child, annual goals, educational services to be
provided, duration of the services, transition services, and evaluation
procedures .92
Second, the IDEA protects the rights of these children and their
parents or guardians. 93 Third, it assists state and local administrators
in providing special education. Finally, it assesses and assures the
effectiveness of special education for children with disabilities. 94
B. Related Services
Under the IDEA, children with disabilities are not only entitled
to a free public education, but one supplemented by related services
when needed. 95 Additionally, when auxiliary aids such as a sign-
language interpreter are necessary to assist a child with a disability
in benefitting from special education, the Court ruled in Board of
Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley
that such aids are part of the student's access to an education. 96
The standard enunciated in Rowley is to be applied to all cases
involving interpreters. 97 It requires that the school district satisfy the
IDEA's purpose of affording a free appropriate public education
by providing "personalized instruction with sufficient support services
to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction. "98
Significantly, the Court did not hold that all hearing impaired children
can benefit educationally only if provided an interpreter.
91. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. III 1991) (footnote added).
92. Id. § 1401(a)(20).
93. Id. § 1400(c).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 200-01 (1982). The issue in Rowley was whether a kindergarten student who
was hearing impaired should have been supplied with a sign-language interpreter
in all her academic classes in lieu of other related services even though she was
achieving academic success without such assistance. The Court ruled that the child
in this case did not need an interpreter because she was performing above grade
level without one. Id. at 210.
97. Rothstein, supra note 82, at 120.
98. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203.
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C. How IDEA Functions in a Parochial School Context
The IDEA extends the state's responsibility to include educating
children with disabilities who are enrolled in private schools. 99 The
act provides that such children may participate in special education
and related services, and that the state will pay for expenses incurred
if the state has actually referred or placed the disabled child in the
private school. 00 But even if placement in a private school is solely
based on a unilateral decision made by the parents of the child with
disabilities, the child is still entitled to access to special education
programs and related services provided by the state. 10'
However, in the narrower context of private religious schools,
the regulations interpreting the law become ambiguous. The Secretary
of the Department of Education has promulgated regulations
specifically forbidding the use of a grant of federal funds to pay
for religious worship, instruction, or proselytization; equipment or
supplies related to religious worship, instruction or proselytization;
construction or maintainance of facilities used for religious purposes;
or an activity of a school or department of divinity. 0 2
The conflict is obvious. On the one hand, the public school
district is responsible for providing special education to students
with disabilities enrolled in private schools. On the other hand,
public schools may not fund instruction or other specified forms of
99. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
100. Id. § 1413(a)(43)(B).
101. 34 C.F.R. § 300.452 (1993). The regulation dictates that "[e]ach LEA [local
educational agency] shall provide special education and related services designed to
meet the needs of private school children with disabilities residing in the jurisdiction
of the agency." o
See McNair v. Oak Hills Local Sch. Dist., 872 F.2d 153, 156 (6th Cir. 1989);
Work v. McKenzie, 661 F. Supp. 225, 229 (D.D.C. 1987). These two cases illustrate
how courts have limited providing related services to private school students. In
McNair, the court denied transportation to a hearing impaired student enrolled in
a private school by parental choice, because the child's need for transportation to
the private school was unrelated to her disability. 872 F.2d at 156. In Work, the
court considered whether EHA required transportation to and from school to be
provided for a child with multiple handicaps attending private school. 661 F.Supp.
at 227. The court denied transportation to this child because her placement in a
private school was the result of a unilateral decision by the parents when an
appropriate alternative public education was possible. Id. at 229.
102. 34 C.F.R. § 76.532 (1993). The Secretary's source of authority to issue this
regulation is 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3(a)(1), 2974(b) (1988), which allows each ad-
ministrative head of an education agency to issue rules and regulations governing
the manner and operation of programs administered by the agency of which he
is head, and 20 U.S.C. §§ 2831(a), 2974(b), 3474 (1988), each of which authorizes
the Secretary to issue regulations considered necessary to ensure compliance with
requirements or manage the functions of the Department.
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aid to private religious schools if potential Establishment Clause
violations exist.
D. The Conflict Between Mandatory Special Education and the
Establishment Clause
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Zobrest, only the lower
federal courts had attempted to resolve the apparent conflict between
mandatory special education and proscribed state aid to religious
schools. 103 Two such cases, Felter v. Cape Girardeau Public School
District'°4 and Goodall v. Stafford County School Board,05 arrived
at opposing resolutions.
In Felter, a federal district court considered whether a child
with a disability enrolled in a parochial school and provided with
transportation to and from her special education classes at a public
school location violated the Establishment Clause. 1°6 In holding the
transportation was constitutional, the court applied the three-pronged
Lemon test.107
On the basis of contrasting fact patterns, the court in Felter
distinguished its holding from that of Goodall. s08 In Goodall, the
parents of a hearing impaired child enrolled in a religious school
requested that the school district provide a speech interpreter to be
present full time in the child's classroom. 109 The school district refused
the request, but offered the service at a public school in the county." 0
The court referred to the U.S. Department of Education's
statement that the school district was not required to provide services
on the premises of private schools unless the specific situation made
103. See, e.g., Pulido v. Cavazo, 934 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1991); Walker v. San
Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 761 F. Supp. 1463 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that
state-provided vans adjacent to or on religious school campuses to serve disabled
students did not violate the Establishment Clause).
104. 810 F. Supp. 1062 (E.D. Mo. 1993).
105. 930 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1991).
106. 810 F. Supp. at 1067.
107. Id. The court's analysis listed four factors to determine if a parent's unilateral
placement of a child in a private school precludes the child from transportation
services. The factors were: (1) the child is handicapped; (2) transportation is a
related service; (3) the related service meets the child's needs resulting from the
handicap; and (4) the school district is responsible for the related services under
EHA, the regulations, and the circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 1066
(citing McNair v. Oak Hills Local Sch. Dist., 872 F.2d 153, 156 (6th Cir. 1989)).
108. Id. at 1068. Goodall involved aids to hearing impaired students working
on-site in parochial schools, distinguishable from transportation services, which are
not conduits for the inculcation of religion.
109. 930 F.2d at 364.
110. Id. at 365.
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on-site services necessary to meet the state's obligation."' Further,
the court found that providing an interpreter at a parochial school
site violated the Code of Federal Regulations" 2 and that it infringed
on the Establishment Clause" 3 because of the pervasive religious
content of the message to be translated by an interpreter." 4
Obviously, then, courts must judge the issue of state aid to
children with disabilities in parochial schools against a complicated
backdrop of constitutional rights, federal statutes and regulations,
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and policy considerations favoring
the education of all children with disabilities. It is this complex
milieu that spawned the Court's significant decision in Zobrest.
V. REASONING OF THE COURT
Writing the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist borrowed
from previous Establishment Clause decisions" 5 to formulate two
rules dispositive in Zobrest. First, neutral government programs
benefitting a broad class of citizens not defined by religion do not
violate the Establishment Clause just because a sectarian institution
receives an incidental or attenuated benefit as well."16 Second, the
fact that a public employee will be present on the site of a religious
school does not make this aid impermissible per se under the Es-
tablishment Clause." 7
The Court prefaced its analysis with the generalized pronounce-
ment that religious institutions may participate in publicly sponsored
social welfare programs." 8 Furthermore, the Court noted that such
institutions have never been absolutely barred from receiving general
government benefits.',9
Ill. d at 1.Q
112. Id. at 369 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 76.532). But see Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2465 n.7 (1993) (interpreting the same regulation as
"merely implement[ing] the Secretary of Education's understanding ... of the
requirements of the Establishment Clause" and contrasting that view with the
Goodall court's reading that-the regulation itself bars state funding of an interpreter
to a student in a sectarian school).
113. Goodall, 930 F.2d at 371.
114. Id. at 371.
115. 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2463. The majority cited as controlling precedents Mueller
v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), and Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), and distinguished Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975), and School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). Id.
116. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467.
117. Id. at 2468-69.
118. Id. at 2466 (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609 (1988)).
119. Id. (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S 263, 274-75 (1981)).
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Relying principally on the holdings of Mueller and Witters as
authority, the Court characterized a program as neutral if it benefits
a broad spectrum of groups without reference to religion, 20 and if
it provides no incentive to participate in sectarian education. 2' The
Court found that a program is likely to be neutral if enrollment in
a religious school results from private choice rather than from any
incentive supplied by the program itself.122 The Court then reasoned
that benefits to the religious school resulting from individual choice
rather than government motives were permissible under the Estab-
lishment Clause. 123
Applying these factors to Zobrest, the Court asserted that the
IDEA distributes benefits neutrally to qualifying children with dis-
abilities. 24 The Court reasoned that the aid retains an element of
neutrality because the recipients do not compose a group defined
by either their religion or the religious or nonreligious nature of the
schools they attend, but rather by their status as children with
disabilities. 25 The requested interpreter would be present in the school
because of the private choice of James Zobrest's parents rather than
any incentive offered as a result of state policy or decision-making.' 26
Further, the Court emphasized that the school itself would
receive no direct benefit by way of an IDEA grant. 127 The Court
explained that in the case of James Zobrest, the only indirect benefit
to the school would be James's tuition, assuming that the school
made a profit on each student and that the child would have attended
school elsewhere had the interpreter not been made available. 2
The Court also held that a public employee's presence in a
religious school did not automatically preclude government aid under
the Establishment Clause. 29 The school district argued that the
Court's holdings in Meek and Grand Rapids necessitated a contrary
holding. 130
120. Id. at 2467 (quoting Mueller, 463 U.S. at 398; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274)
(citing Witters, 474 U.S. at 491; Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schs.
(Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990)).
121. Id. (quoting Witters, 474 U.S. at 488).
122. Id.
123. Id. (quoting Witters, 474 U.S. at 488) (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229, 244 (1977)).





129. Id. at 2468-69.
130. Id. at 2468. The Court in Meek invalidated the law allowing funds for
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In distinguishing the facts in Zobrest from Meek and Grand
Rapids, the Court stated that the rulings in those cases were in-
applicable to Zobrest for two reasons. First, the state laws in Meek
and Grand Rapids provided substantial direct aid to the schools,
relieving the schools of costs they would otherwise have had to bear
and thus granting a direct subsidy. 3' The Court viewed this subsidy
as impermissible aid to the sectarian enterprise, in contrast to the
facts in Zobrest, in which Salpointe was not relieved of any of its
obligations to its students and in which the aid to one of its students
afforded only an incidental benefit to the school itself.'3 2
Second, the Court distinguished between the on-site services in
Zobrest and those provided in Meek and Grand Rapids.'33 The Court
explained that a sign-language interpreter differs from a teacher or
guidance counselor because the interpreter only interprets the material
presented to the class as a whole. 34
Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissent, countered the ma-
jority's two-part holding.'35 He rejected the argument that because
the IDEA is a general, neutrally applied program aiding parents and
students rather than schools, there is no constitutional violation. 3 6
remedial and accelerated instruction and guidance counseling on the campus of the
religious schools. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 368 (1975). In Grand Rapids,
the Court ruled that the state could not provide on-site teaching services. School
Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985).
131. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2468.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2469. The Court observed that the Establishment Clause is not an
absolute barrier to state-paid employees on religious school premises. It further
noted that its holding in Wolman rejected the First Amendment challenge to
diagnostic speech and hearing services. Id. at 2469 n.10.
134. Id. at 2469. The Court explained that the interpreter "will neither add to
nor subtract from the [pervasively sectarian] environment."
135. Id. at 2469 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In addition to objecting to the
majority's decision on the Establishment Clause question, the dissent took issue
with the Court's refusal to decide the case on nonconstitutional grounds not
previously raised in the lower court. The school district's nonconstitutional grounds
were that: (1) 34 C.F.R. § 76.532(a)(1) (1992), a regulation promulgated under the
IDEA, precluded using federal funds to provide an interpreter in a parochial school;
(2) even if there was no bar, the school district was not required by statute or
regulation to furnish interpreters to students at sectarian schools; and (3) the Arizona
Constitution art. 11, § 12, prohibited such a service. Id. at 2465.
The dissent cited several federal court cases which have held that the IDEA does
not establish an entitlement to services if the individual attends a private school
by choice. Id. at 2470 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Goodall v. Stafford County
Sch. Bd., 930 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1991); McNair v. Cardimone, 676 F. Supp. 1361
(S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd sub nom. McNair v. Oak Hills Local Sch. Dist., 872 F.2d
153 (6th Cir. 1989); Work v. McKenzie, 661 F. Supp. 225 (D.D.C. 1987)).
136. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2473 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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The dissent asserted that even a general welfare program may have
constitutionally prohibited applications, such as the state providing
on-site teachers. 137 Such a related service would be invalid regardless
of whether the aid was paid directly to the parents and students,
or to the school. 3 8
More importantly, the dissent observed that the pivotal point
in the Court's argument was the distinction between a teacher and
a sign-language interpreter. 39 Justice Blackmun noted the Court's
consistent ruling in previous cases that the Establishment Clause
absolutely forbids government-financed religious indoctrination 40
through state-subsidized teachers.' 4'
The dissent also explained that in broader applications of this
principle, the Court has consistently rejected government subsidy of
resources advancing a school's religious mission. 142 The dissent argued
that advancing a school's religious message is precisely what the
Court permitted in ruling that the school district was required to
supply the medium or conduit for that message 143 in the form of
a sign-language interpreter. 44
VI. SIGNIFICANCE
Zobrest effectively removes a constitutional barrier to the de-
livery of certain forms of related services to children with disabilities
137. Id. (citing Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 410 (1985); School Dist. of
Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985); Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349,
371 (1985)).
138. Id. Such a distinction would "exalt form over substance." Id. (quoting
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977)).
139. Id.
140. Id. (quoting Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 385).
141. Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)).
142. Id. at 2473-74. The dissent reasoned that the proscription of supplying
resources to advance the school's religious mission was the basis for upholding bus
transportation in Everson but rejecting buses for field trips in Wolman; permitting
secular textbooks in Allen while proscribing instructional aids like tape recorders
in Wolman; allowing diagnostic testing in religious schools in Wolman while for-
bidding remedial teachers and counselors in Meek. Id. (citing Meet v. Pittinger,
421 U.S. 349, 371 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1977); Board
of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v.
Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1946)).
143. Id. at 2474. The dissent noted that a sectarian school violates the Estab-
lishment Clause when it uses "the machinery of the State to enforce a religious
orthodoxy." Id. (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658 (1992)).
144. Id. at 2472. The dissent further found that "[a] state-employed sign-language
interpreter would be required to communicate the material covered in religion class,
the nominally secular subjects that are taught from a religious perspective, and the
daily Masses at which Salpointe encourages attendance for Catholic students." Id.
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in parochial schools. Furthermore, the Court's abandonment of the
traditional Lemon terminology in this decision may represent the
commencement of a trend in Establishment Clause analysis. Rea-
soning that dispenses with an inflexible, purpose-effect-entanglement
approach while still applying the most apposite precedents could
result in a less stringent test. The test will likely permit more state
aid to religious schools to evade the threat of the Establishment
Clause.
A. Delivery of Related Services
The issue of the constitutionality of parochial aid usually depends
on the type of aid and the manner supplied. As one commentator
has observed, the constitutional question is frequently not whether,
but how, the aid could be supplied.' 45
Though the Court has held that various forms of auxiliary aid
are impermissible, the form most consistently found unconstitutional
in the state aid/parochial school situation is that of the state employee
present on the school's site and capable of inculcating a religious
message. Until Zobrest, Aguilar'4 was considered by special education
experts to be the controlling precedent in determining how such
instructional services related to special education could be supplied
to parochial school students. 47
Because the Court in Aguilar ruled that the state could not
deliver remedial instruction to educationally deprived children on
the site of parochial schools, that same rule was applied to the
context of special education. Hence, most school districts since
Aguilar have met their instructional responsibilities to parochial school
students with disabilities by providing related services off-campus,
either at a public school or a neutral location.
However, this form of delivery is not an acceptable option for
children with certain types of disabilities. 48 James Zobrest and his
need for an interpreter in the parochial school classroom is an
example. The nature of his special needs rendered an off-campus
interpreter useless. Under the IDEA's individualized education
program, which tailors related services to the needs and educational
goals of each individual child with disabilities, James was entitled
to an interpreter. The school district conceded as much, but only
145. Guernsey, supra note 5, at 269.
146. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
147. See Osborne, supra note 76, at 1-2; Guernsey, supra note 5, at 276-77.
148. See Osborne, supra note 76, at 2.
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if he enrolled in either a public school in the district or a nonreligious
private school. Furthermore, it would seem that James Zobrest met
the standard imposed by Rowley with regard to interpeters. The
IDEA granted him a right to personalized instruction with sufficient
support services to permit the child to benefit from that instruction.
Without an interpreter, James Zobrest's education was worthless.
Because school districts generally do not provide related services
on-site, parents like the Zobrests have faced the same daunting
dilemma. They can either pay for the instructional service themselves,
or disregard their religious beliefs and any other relevant factors
that may have resulted in parochial school placement, and place
their children in public schools where the services are available. 49
Furthermore, off-site alternatives may occasionally be
unacceptable even when it is otherwise possible to effectively deliver
the related services in a neutral location. In Board of Education of
Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet,'50 members of the
separatist religious enclave of Satmar Hasideim refused to send their
children with disabilities to public schools for special education
because their religious and cultural views were so different from
those residing outside the Hasidic Village. Thus, parents of children
with disabilities believed all forms of special education delivered
away from the village were simply not an option.
In its narrowest interpretation, Zobrest gives relief to some
children with disabilities by removing the Establishment Clause barrier
to state-provided, on-site sign-language interpreters under proper
circumstances.' 51 A very broad reading of the case seems unjustified
because Zobrest simply does not approve all on-site, state-paid
149. Osborne, supra note 76, at 2. The author reasons that parents and their
children who have to choose do not have the same freedom of choice that parents
of nondisabled children have.
150. 62 U.S.L.W. 4665, 4666 (U.S. June 27, 1994). In the first case decided by
the Court after Zobrest on the issue of whether state aid to students with disabilities
in religious schools violates the Establishment Clause, the Court held that a public
school district created by law especially to accomodate children with disabilities in
a Hasidic Village was a violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 4671. In
contrast to Zobrest, where state aid was neutrally available without regard to a
particular religious sect, the Court found that the creation of a school district
coterminus with the Satmar Village aided a particular religious community rather
than a broad spectrum of groups similarly interested in separate schools. Id.
151. See Osborne, supra note 76, at 8 (predicting in advance of the Zobrest
decision that Zobrest would involve a narrowly focused issue. The author stated
that if the Court equated the interpreter to a mechanical device rather than an
instructor, this would only remove constitutional barriers to other such aids like
braille printers.) However, the Court in Zobrest recognized no such comparison.
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employees serving children with disabilities in parochial schools.
Significantly, the Court in Zobrest chose to distinguish rather than
overrule Meek and Grand Rapids for two reasons: (1) the state aid
in Meek and Grand Rapids directly subsidized the schools,'52 and
(2) a sign-language interpreter differs in function from state-supplied
teachers and guidance counselors.'53
By distinguishing these facts, the Court implied that it is still
an impermissible violation of the Establishment Clause to place state-
paid teachers and guidance counselors in a sectarian school
environment. The Court has viewed such support as an impermissible
aid to the enterprise, if the state funds personnel the school is
otherwise obligated to supply.5 4
However, the Court in Zobrest did note that in Wolman it
specifically permitted diagnostic speech and hearing services on
sectarian school premises and condoned off-site therapeutic services. 5
Moreover, the Court explained that in Meek, 56 it had struck down
auxiliary speech and hearing services because they were unseverable
from the offending parts of the state's law. The Court in Meek
emphasized that as part of a general welfare program, such auxiliary
services were not readily subject to an Establishment Clause
challenge. 5 7
Thus, in terms of constitutional boundaries, Zobrest expands
the scope of the IDEA to permit certain on-site, state-paid personnel
in parochial schools. The Court, however, drew the line at teachers,
guidance counselors, and any other employees the school would
otherwise be obligated to pay, as well as personnel who play an
instructional role. Within those limits, permissible aid may include
providing special education consultants to help plan instruction and
coordinate programs for the child with disabilities, psychologists to
152. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2468; See also Arkansas Department of Education,
Referral, Placement and Appeal Procedures for Special Education and Related
Services 15 (1993) (specifically prohibiting use of Title VI-B funds to the advantage
of any private school, including the placement of teachers and other personnel
unless the payment is for work outside regular duties).
153. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2469. See T. Page Johnson, Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District: Does the Establishment Clause Bar Sending Public School
Employees into Religious Schools?, 82 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 5, 13 (1993) in which
the author contrasts the function of a teacher, who instructs and evaluates, with
a sign-language interpreter, who merely transmits the message and is therefore not
subject to the three objections to state-paid teachers set out in Grand Rapids.
154. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2468 (citing Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 365-
66 (1985)).
155. Id. at 2469 n.10 (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244 (1977)).
156. Id. (citing Meek, 421 U.S. at 371 n.21 ).
157. Meek, 421 U.S. at 371 n.21.
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treat emotional or other mental problems, physical therapists, and
paraprofessionals of various kinds to work one-on-one with the
child."' If Zobrest is the benchmark for aid to children with disabilities
in parochial schools, an on-site, certified teacher of children who
are visually impaired may also pass the Establishment Clause test.
Furthermore, other types of auxiliary aid and related services not
specifically provided for by IDEA might now be within reach through
the Rehabilitation Act and ADA.
If the Establishment Clause were the only barrier to such state
aid, public school districts would now be facing a costly duplication
of services in the wake of Zobrest. Currently, school districts generally
provide related services at centralized locations to accommodate
children with disabilities enrolled in private schools in order to
economize and efficiently allocate scarce resources.5 9 In 1989, 88,522
children between the ages of 3 and 21 were being served by EHA
in private schools.' 6 Moreover, of the 25,616 private elementary and
secondary schools in the United States, 20,682 are sectarian. 16'
Considering, then, that the overwhelming number of private schools
are also religiously affiliated, the Establishment Clause has previously
served as an effective means of avoiding costly duplication of services
in private schools.
However, the Establishment Clause is not the only hurdle children
with disabilities in sectarian parochial schools must overcome in
asserting their entitlement to IDEA's special education services on
their campuses. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's constitutional
blessing, the federal statute, its regulations, and state laws may
prohibit such administration. 62 If statutory and regulatory barriers
158. See Arkansas Department of Education, Program and Standards and Eli-
gibility Criteria for Special Education (1993), for a thorough description of various
kinds of special education personnel and auxiliary programs.
159. Allocation of scarce resources is the only policy reason behind the practice
of serving private school disabled children at centralized locations in the Little
Rock School District. Interview with Patti Kohler, Little Rock School District
Special Education Coordinator (October 2, 1993).
160. McKinney, supra note 30, at 4 (citing Eleventh Annual Report to Congress
on the Implemeaitation of the Education of Handicapped Act, U.S. Department
of Education, 1989).
161. McKinney, supra note 30, at 4 (citing Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the U.S. 1989, Digest of Education Statistics).
162. See, e.g., Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2470 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent
asserted that "petitioners will not obtain what they seek if the federal statute does
not require or the federal regulations prohibit provisions of a sign language in-
terpreter in a sectarian school." Id.
See also Goodall, 930 F.2d at 366, 369 (holding a parochial school student was
not entitled to an interpreter, not only because of Establishment Clause violations,
but also because of prohibitions by Virginia's state constitution and code and the
federal statutes and regulations).
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are based solely on religion, parochial school students then have the
option of asserting a constitutional Free Exercise challenge to the
statute, assuming there is an absence of any Establishment Clause
violation. 163
B. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
Zobrest is also significant because of its effect on Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. 164 The Court's analysis of the issue represents
a rare departure from traditional Lemon analysis in that it does not
specifically inquire into a legislative purpose, question whether the
IDEA has the primary effect of advancing religion, or hypothesize
on potential government-church entanglement. In Lee v. Weisman, 65
decided the year before Zobrest, the Court also refrained from putting
the relevant issue through the purpose-effect-entanglement paces of
Lemon. In order to decide the issue, the Court relied instead on
controlling precedents, an approach with remnants of the purpose
and effect prongs of Lemon analysis, if not its threadbare terminology.
It was that method the Court returned to in Zobrest.
Both the federal district court and the circuit court of appeals
decided against the Zobrests on the basis of the Lemon test. The
Court, however, again explicitly ignored that approach, reaching
back instead to the pre-Lemon child benefit theory first espoused
in Everson and Allen: If the aid is a neutrally applied program
benefitting a group without reference to religion, then it does not
violate the Clause; incidental or indirect aid is of no consequence
because it stems from private choice rather than government decision-
making.'6 In choosing to inquire who is directly benefited, rather
163. An Establishment Clause violation trumps a Free Exercise challenge when
the two are asserted by opposing sides in a dispute. The Zobrests originally asserted
that the IDEA and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required the
school district to provide an interpreter, but did not raise the Free Exercise issue
on appeal.
164. In some instances, courts since Zobrest have applied the Lemon framework
more tentatively. See, e.g., Osteraas v. Osteraas, 859 P.2d 948, 953 n.4 (Idaho
1993) (emphasizing that while the Court in Zobrest did not specifically apply the
Lemon test, it did not overturn it either); Warner v. Orange County Dep't of
Probation, 827 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that the decisions in
Lee and Zobrest imply that the Court seems less inclined to rely on Lemon).
165. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
166. See McKinney, supra note 30, at 7, in which the author attacks the child
benefit theory as unsound, both analytically and practically-speaking, because even
if the aid is provided to the student, it ultimately flows to the school. He theorizes
that indirect aid has the same effect as direct aid in establishing a relationship
between church and government and alleviating financial burdens to both church
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than whether the ultimate effect is to advance religion, the Court
may well have been influenced by a persuasive public policy that
advocates educating and encouraging persons with disabilities to live
productive and independent lives. That policy tips the scales in favor
of this type of aid granted in this particular context, but applying
the rule in Zobrest to dissimilar fact situations is not warranted.
Although the majority did not refer explicitly to Lemon, the
elements of purpose and effect are evident in the Court's reasoning
nonetheless. 167 The emphasis on neutrality signifies the IDEA's
acceptable purpose. Because the program benefits children without
subsidizing the school, its primary effect also withstands constitutional
scrutiny because it does not advance religion. The Court ignored
the excessive entanglement prong of Lemon, perhaps because it simply
was not applicable to Zobrest. After all, government surveillance of
a single interpreter seems unnecessary, and, therefore, the likelihood
of state-church entanglement was remote in the case.
Though the Court used a similar approach in Lee and Zobrest,
the two cases do not constitute a trend.'6 It also should be noted
that Lee involved the issue of religion in the public schools rather
than state aid to religious schools. Nevertheless, the two might
foreshadow the Court's eventual phasing out of Lemon, incorporating
vestiges of Lemon as defined by the broad principle of neutrality,
or reformulating the test without its lethal excessive entanglement
prong.
In fact, Justice O'Connor advocated such approaches as these
when she wrote her concurring opinion in the Grumet case' 69 decided
a year after Zobrest. Again addressing the Establishment Clause
issue involved in granting state aid to children with disabilities in
religious schools, the majority in Grumet did not specifically apply
and school. The author explains that indirect aid promotes parochial school at-
tendance, thus advancing the mission of the school.
See also Ralph D. Mawdsley, Emerging Legal Issues in Nonpublic Education,
83 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 6 (1993), which discusses how resuscitating the child benefit
theory circumvents the Lemon test and provides a constitutionally acceptable vehicle
for government funding of nonpublic schools.
167. See Gonzales v. North Township, 4 F.3d 1412, 1419 (7th Cir. 1993) (observing
that while the Court in Zobrest seemed to avoid the Lemon analysis, it relied on
Mueller and Witters, both of which did use the Lemon analysis, so that, practically
speaking, the three-pronged test is still in effect in Zobrest).
168. In fact, only 11 days before Zobrest was decided, the Court applied Lemon
to determine that permitting church access to school premises did not offend the
Establishment Clause. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moliches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
113 S. Ct. 2141, 2148 (1993). The Court emphatically stated that Lemon has not
been overruled. Id. at 2148 n.7.
169. 62 U.S.L.W. 4665 (U.S. June 27, 1994).
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the Lemon analysis. Justice O'Connor approved because "[t]hese
are different categories of Establishment Clause cases, which may
call for different approaches."' 70 But different analyses do not
necessarily translate into a total abandonment of Lemon principles. 17'
In the same vein, Zobrest does not toll the death knell for either
Lemon or the Establishment Clause. It simply establishes a more
flexible approach when the issue involves children with disabilities."
Mardi L. Blissard
170. Id. at 1674.
171. But see McKinney, supra note 30, at 18, in which the author asserts that
in Zobrest, "what is really at stake is the future of the [E]stablishment [Cilause
of the First Amendment." He observes that a liberal judicial policy of allowing
more state aid to religiously affiliated schools will result in issues of church-state
relations being resolved in the political arena by the legislature rather than by the
Court.
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